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Dec., 1953
BANKS AND BANKING, INSURANCE, TORTS
DUDLEY I. HUTCHINSON, SR. of the Boulder Bar
BANKS AND BANKING
Carrol v. Bank I was the only case regarding banking law
decided, wherein it was held that a bank is not liable for damages
in refusing to allow a depositor to draw against the proceeds of a
deposited check until such check has been cleared.
INSURANCE
In the case of Insurance Company v. Heller 2 the Court states
that the provisions of an insurance policy which are written in
plain and unambiguous language and do not contravene some prin-
ciple of public policy will be strictly construed against the insured,
regardless of how disadvantageous such construction might be to
the insured.
In the case of Reed Auto Sales v. Empire Delivery Service,3
it was held that under a loss payable clause, both the mortgagor and
the mortgagee may join as real parties in interest when the amount
of the loss is equal to or in excess of the amount of the mortgage,
but that the mortgagee is the real party in interest when the
amount of loss does not exceed the amount of the mortgage.
In the case of Insurance Company v. Mitchell,4 it was held
that an insurance company is not estopped from denying liability
under the terms of a policy, after first securing a non-waiver agree-
ment from the insured, even though such company enters an ap-
pearance for the insured and actively participates in the trial
which ends in a verdict for the plaintiffs.
The case of Traders Insurance Co. v. Pioneer Mutual 5 in-
volved a garage owner's liability policy which provided that any
insurance provided therein with respect to the automobile owned by
the insured, should conform to the provisions of the motor vehicle
financial responsibility law with respect to any such liability aris-
ing from the use of such automobile. The Court ruled that coverage
under such policy, the accident occurring where one was driving
the automobile owned by the insured and with his permission,
attached since that provision placed the policy within the terms
of c. 16, § 56, Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935). The effect of this decision
was to greatly broaden the coverage under garage owners' lia-
bility policies which Lheretofore had enjoyed restricted coverage.
TORTS
Three cases have been decided within the past year relating
1 126 Colo. 377, 249 P. 2d 540 (1952).
........ Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 966, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 21, 1953).
........ Colo .......... 254 P. 2d 1018, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 21, 1953).
........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 862, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 25, 1953).
....... Colo .......... 258 P. 2d 776, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (June 6,.1953).
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to the Colorado Guest Statute. The first case, Havis v. Iacovetto,6
raised the question of whether a passenger for hire, while engaging
in an unlawful activity (a professional gambler) is prevented
from avoiding the provisions of the Guest Rider Statute. The
Supreme Court held in this case that recovery by the professional
gambler was not barred even though his activities were unlawful
so long as his participation in such unlawful activity had no casual
connection with the injury complained of.
In both the case of Clark v. Hicks 7 and Dameron v. West,"
the Court clearly set forth what requirements must be met in order
to satisfy the provisions of the Colorado Guest Rider Statute. The
Court states that even though a driver has no intent of injuring
his passenger, if he was conscious of his conduct and from the
knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions,
knew or should have known that to continue his course of conduct
would naturally and probably result in injury, then the require-
ments of the Statute have been met.
In the case of Rosa v. The Union Pacific Railroad,9 the trial
court's entry of summary judgment for the defendant based upon
the pleadings and deposition of the plaintiff was reversed. The
plaintiff's deposition virtually admitted contributory negligence
but the pleadings injected the question of last clear chance. The
Court held that a sufficient question of fact was raised by the
pleadings so as to preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Three cases have been decided on the application of the doc-
trine of last clear chance; the first of them, Werner v. Schrader,1 °
setting forth an excellent discussion on the application of this
doctrine in Colorado. The Court definitely states that the applica-
tion of the doctrine presupposes negligence on the part of both
the plaintiff and defendant, and also presumes that after such
negligence has occurred, the defendant could and the plaintiff
could not, by use of means available, avert the accident. The Court
states further that contemporaneous negligence by both parties
until the moment of the accident prevents the application of the
doctrine, and in Comer v. Dodd,11 the Court states that in order
for the doctrine of last clear chance to apply, the evidence must
clearly show that the defendant's action were the proximate cause
of the injury. In Patch v. Boman,12 the Court refused to apply
the doctrine in the light of evidence that shows clearly that the
plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the injury.
Four interesting cases were decided with regard to the lia-
bility of property owners to persons coming on to their property.
0 126 Colo. 407, 250 P. 2d 128 (1952).
........ Colo ......... 252 P. 2d 1067, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 31, 1953).
8126 Colo. 435, 250 P. 2d 592 (1952).
'...Colo ......... , 252 P. 2d 825, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 3, 1953).
10 ........ Colo .......... 258 P. 2d 766, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (June 6, 1953).
.... Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 300, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 21, 1953).
................. 257 P. 2d 418, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (May 9, 1953).
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in Security Building Co. v. Lewis, 13 the Court states that the prop-
erty owner, with regard to liability toward a tenant, is not an in-
surer but rather merely owes a duty toward such tenant of ordi-
nary care and that such duty runs to the safe condition of the
premises and not to the duty of discovery of any defects. In the
case of Atkinson v. Ives,14 it is pointed out that a property owner
owes a duty toward a licensee to refrain from wilfully and inten-
tionally injuring and to use reasonable care after being aware of
his presence on the premises. The Court goes further to state with
regard to an invitee, that such property owner must not negligently
allow conditions to exist that would imperil the invitee's safety,
but that such liability cannot attach unless the property owner has
knowledge of the conditions that caused the injury. Likewise, in
the case of The Denver Dry Good Company v. Pender,5 it was
stated that the property owner is not bound to foresee or guard
against casualties on the premises that are not expected in the
ordinary course of events or which might result from some unusual
or peculiar act of the plaintiff, and that some notice or knowledge
of the particular defect must first be shown before liability can
be established. In the case of Cordon v. Clotsworthy,0 it was held
that an employer owes a duty to the employee to exercise ordinary
care in seeing that a reasonably safe place is provided to work,
but an employer is not an insurer of the safety of the employee
and that any negligence asserted cannot rest upon surmise, specu-
lation or conjecture but must be grounded upon substantial evi-
dence.
In the case of City of Denver v. Dugdale, ' 7 the Court held
that the City of Denver was not chargeable with constructive no-
tice of a slippery condition on its sidewalk which had lasted for
a period of two days and was caused by natural causes. The Court
draws a distinction between a natural accumulation of ice and
snow and an accumulation which is put there by artificial means.
In the case of Sawyer v. Blanchard,18 it was held that sepa-
rate verdicts against the taxi-cab company and the taxi-cab driver
are not proper and that there can be no separate liability since
liability in such case is necessarily joint due to the negligence of
the driver.
In Spillane v. Wright,1 9 the evidence showed that the three
defendants were jointly prosecuting a common undertaking and
each had apparent authority to act for all and that each had done
some small part in the joint undertaking. The Court ruled that
it was proper to instruct the jury that if any one of the defend-
ants was negligent, such negligence would constitute negligence
is ........ Colo ......... 255 P. 2d 405, C.D.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 7, 1953).
14 ........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 749, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 14, 1953).
........ Colo .......... C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
16 ........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 410, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Apr. 25, 1953).
17 -------- Colo .......... 256 P. 2d 898, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (April 4, 1953).
126 Colo. 485, 251 P. 2d 434 (1952).
'1 ........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 1078, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 4, 1953).
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on the, part of any and all defendants.
In the case of Wetzel v. Bates, 20 the Court again follows the
rule that in order to have negligence, it must be shown that the
defendant was under a duty and that his actions did not measure
up to the requirements and standards of that duty. And in Mc-
Brayer v. Zordell,21 the Court states that if injury could have been
due to several causes, any one of which might have been the sole
proximate cause, it must be shown as between these causes that
it was the defendant's negligence that caused the injury com-
plained of.
In the case of Gossard v. Watson,2- the plaintiff was operating
a pick-up truck following a vehicle operated by the defendant. An-
other one of the defendant's trucks was following plaintiff. De-
fendant's lead vehicle stopped, and plaintiff alleged that his
pick-up truck was pushed from the rear into the on-coming lane
of traffic where a collision occurred with another of defendant's
trucks. Defendant alleged that the plaintiff was following too
closely in violation of the statute,23 and such violation constituted
contributory negligence. The Supreme Court held that a pick-up
truck is not a "motor truck" within the meaning said statute and
further, that violation of the statute is not negligence per se but
that such violation must be shown to be the proximate cause of the
collision. The Court further pointed out the extreme danger of
reciting isolated sections of statutes in the instructions without
explanation or consideration of the facts as shown by the evidence.
In Scott v. Matzuda,24 it is stated that a trial court abuses its
discretion by granting a new trial when the record discloses evi-
dence sufficient to support the finding of the jury. And in Schell v.
Kuflhem,25 the Court again states that every presumption favors
the correctness of the jury verdict and that the findings of such
jury will not be disturbed and reviewed in the absence of a clear
showing of passion or prejudice.
In the case of Herdt v. Darbin,2 6 the Court states that an in-
struction on unavoidable accident is not warranted where the facts
are such that a collision between two cars could have been fore-
seen, anticipated or avoided.
In Kelty v. Swinney,27 dismissal of an action under the Wrong-
ful Death Statute was upheld, the Court holding that negligence
must be shown in order to recover under the Wrongful Death
Statute.
In the case of Postma v. Smith,28 the Court distinguishes be-
........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 291, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 4, 1953).
........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 962, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (May 9, 1953).
. ........ Colo .......... C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
"Colorado Session Laws, 1945, c. 80.
........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 403, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 28, 1953).
0 ........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 861, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (April 25, 1953).
"4126 Colo. 355, 249 P. 2d 822 (1952).
........ Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 965 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 21, 1953).
n .......- Colo .......... C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 25, 1953).
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tween a situation where (1) medical treatment is performed as
contracted for but in a negligent manner and where (2) medical
treatment other than that contracted for is performed; the Court
stating that in the former case it is a matter of mal-practice under
the two-year statute of limitations and that in the latter case it is
a matter of assault and battery under the one-year statute of limita-
tions. Thus, where the plaintiff engaged the defendant to perform
The case of Spears v. Maier 29 involved an alleged libel where
the defendant, a medical doctor, made out and signed a death cer-
tificate for a person who had formerly been a patient of plaintiff's
santatorium, stating that she had died from criminal neglect at
plaintiff's sanatorium. Action was brought three and one-half
years later, and the defendant pleaded the three-year statute of
limitations. The question presented was whether or not the fact
that the death certificate was a matter of public record constituted
a continuous publication of the alleged libel so as to take the case
out of the statute of limitations. The Court held that the fact that
many people read a libel is evidence as to the extent of damage
therefrom, but does not in itself establish publication as to each
reader. The Court held that to rule otherwise would effectively
nullify the statute of limitations. In addition, the Court states
that doctors of medicine are not ipso facto incompetent witnesses
as to any fact regarding the standards of chiropractic medicine,
but rather, the question of competency should be raised with re-
gard to the evidence introduced.
Franzen v. Zimmerman 30 in following the precedent of Giggy
v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 73 P. 2d 1100,
states that a wife may not bring action for loss of consortium due
to the injury of her husband.
Manion v. Stephens ' involves the case of a mysterious dis-
appearance of a certain number of plaintiff's turkeys and a simi-
lar appearance of approximately the same number of turkeys in
the defendant's flock. Action was brought for civil conversion. The
Supreme Court held that the motive with which a defendant acts
and whether with or without ill-will or malice is immaterial in an
action for conversion, and that the action for conversion will lie
even though the act or acts upon which the action is based are done
in good faith, sincerely, innocently, inadvertently or by mistake.
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
ao256 P. 2d 897, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (April 25, 1953).
"C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
RETURN YOUR PLEDGE CARD
Pledge cards for use in making contributions to the COLO-
RADO BAR FOUNDATION have been mailed to all members of
the Colorado Bar Association. The first list of contributors will
be published in the February, 1954, issue of Dicta. Return your
pledge now.
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